Synopsis
It is important to note that when surveillance legislation is enacted, the Minister accountable to Parliament for the public authority that undertakes the surveillance will usually be the Minister who guides the legislation through Parliament. So, for example, the Home Secretary will deal with surveillance associated with policing and the Security Service, whilst the Secretary of State for Health will deal with health surveillance. Thus it is the Minister who is politically accountable for the surveillance policy (and for the bodies that undertake the surveillance) who effectively establishes the privacy constraints that apply to that surveillance. Often this surveillance legislation will define the powers or role of an independent regulator and dictate how and to whom the regulator reports (often to the Minister concerned with surveillance policy 1 ).
Part II empower the Commissioner beyond the posing of questions.
Identity management will encourage linkages between databases and mass data retention will also facilitate the emergence of new data mining techniques, mainly because it is known that the personal data are retained. For example:
• familial techniques can use the DNA data of known criminals on the UK's National DNA database to identify other family members that do not have a criminal record; in this way, a DNA database of criminals could eventually span most of the UK population (Pounder: 2006) ;
• the Serious Crime Act 2007 authorised the Audit Commission to extend its data matching techniques from benefit fraud to debt recovery 7 , possibly to include private sector databases;
• Ministers have been given powers to disclose patient registration information from the NHS Summary Care Record to the newly formed Statistics Board 8 for its purposes; and • communications data are retained by law on the grounds that retention is needed for anti-terrorism purposes; however a separate law allows many organisations access to communications data for diverse purposes 9 .
In summary, the point being made is not whether a particular activity or technique or system is acceptable or not, but rather to stress that if personal data are retained in connection with one purpose, then such retention will always encourage the emergence of other ideas for the use of these data. As function creep can always be authorised by a future law, function creep should be anticipated as an inevitability. So the question then arises as to whether the current legal framework or system of scrutiny affords sufficient protection when such function creep occurs, or provides the correct structure to balance the opposing objectives (the public interest served by performing a new purpose against the public interest served by maintaining individual privacy)..
Why data protection legislation will not afford sufficient privacy protection
All legislation that legitimises retention, surveillance or sharing of personal data, to some extent, will negate the protective effect of most of the eight Data Protection Principles of the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998.
The central problem arises if surveillance legislation such as the ID Card Act 2006 states that X items of personal data are to be processed for purpose P1 for Y years, and can be disclosed to organisation Z for purpose P2 10 . In such circumstances, it is going to be very difficult to claim that the First, Second, Third and Fifth Data Protection Principles have been breached because the enactment of surveillance legislation establishes that:
• the processing purposes are lawful and compatible (meeting the relevant First • specifies the duration of the processing of personal data (satisfying the Fifth Principle obligations over data retention) and
• specifies the items of personal data to be processed (satisfying the Third Principle obligations in connection with the relevance of the personal data to the purpose).
As the disclosure to Z for purpose P2 is likely to be also subject to the exemption from the nondisclosure provisions 11 , the Fourth Principle and parts of the Sixth Principle can additionally be negated with respect to any disclosure of personal data 12 The Committee stated that it wanted an Assessment "at the very minimum" to include details that:
• "identify the Convention rights and any other human rights engaged by the bill, and the specific provisions of the bill which engage those rights;
• explain the reasons why it is thought that there is no incompatibility with the right engaged;
• where the rights engaged are qualified rights, identify clearly the pressing social need which is relied on to justify any interference with those rights;
• assess the likely impact of the measures on the rights engaged;
• explain the reasons why it is considered that any interference with those rights is justified; and
• cite the evidence that has been taken into account by the Department in the course of its assessment". The Committee stated that in relation to eighteen Bills that had data sharing provisions that "the Government's response has generally been to resist our recommendations" on the grounds that "public authorities must comply with the provisions of the Data Protection and Human Rights Acts". It stressed that it "fundamentally disagreed" with an approach to setting data sharing policy that depended on "very broad enabling provisions" that grant Ministers far reaching powers. The
Committee recommended that data sharing purposes should be specified in primary legislation as this would "increase the opportunity to hold the executive to account".
It is also worth adding that there is also a lack of information for scrutiny purposes in the field of national security (Pounder, WE 156) 
Scrutiny of Secondary Legislation is also generally deficient

International Treaties or Decisions of the Council of Ministers are often presented to Parliament as fait accompli -for example the ICAO agreement to capture two fingerprints was used in Parliament to justify the capture of all ten fingerprints for the purpose of the ID Card.
The reason why the JCHR is concerned to ensure that any data sharing purpose is specified in primary legislation arises because secondary legislation, enacted via the use of Statutory Instruments (SI), are subject to limited scrutiny in Parliament (if any scrutiny actually occurs) 23 .
Ministers can therefore expect the use of their powers to be approved by Parliament and it is a very rare occurrence that an SI is defeated or withdrawn 24 . Even so, the scrutiny of that part of primary legislation which grants the powers to Ministers can also be limited, because of the timetabling procedures are regularly used by Government to ensure that legislation, such as the ID Card Act, passes through Parliament quickly.
The result is that human rights issues are considered by Government when the powers are being made ready for use and not when the powers are being obtained. Pre-legislative scrutiny by Parliament is effectively replaced by post-legislative scrutiny by the Courts. Scrutiny in these circumstances becomes the preserve of those rich enough (or poor enough in the case of legal aid)
to take human rights cases through the Courts in an attempt to strike out statutory instruments.
This legal tussle is also an unequal struggle -the average citizen is pitted against a Government which has access to a bottomless public purse and teams of its own lawyers, if need be.
There are three other problems with the current lack of scrutiny as identified above.
• The Government can use the "powers could be struck-out" argument to ignore criticism in Select Committee Reports which relate to wide ranging powers 25 .
• If a Court were to strike out a Ministerial order (as has happened in the field of terrorism) it would bring with it the prospect of further clashes between the Government and the Courts and thereby risk of politicising the judiciary. • If secondary legislation were to be struck out by the courts, it is possible to envisage circumstances where Ministers would just draft another alternative instrument circumventing any legal problem. The result could be that any legal challenge would need to start again at square one 26 . this extension was prepared, but its publication was delayed for nine months until three weeks after the Bill had received Royal Assent 30 .
As is well known, since Royal Assent, the ID Card project has been subject to considerable delay and revision; it is not known whether the use of the NIR as a population register still form part of the plans for the NIR.
PART II: THE NINE PRINCIPLES Why the Principles are needed
In Part II, the nine Principles are presented in order to provide a framework that corrects the structural defects identified in Part 1. The Principles interact with each other and should be considered as a whole.
As with Part 1, personal data processed as a result of a surveillance activity, any sharing of personal data and any revelation of identity information are all considered to be a surveillance activity. The Principles therefore apply to "dataveillance" (Clarke R: website). This extension is important because Government policy involves joined-up public services and widespread data sharing where there is a risk that mistrust of one part of Government also becomes joined-up 31 . It is argued that the application of these Principles to the development of surveillance policy, or to the bodies performing the surveillance, would help maintain public confidence 32 in legitimate surveillance. 
Commentary on the Principle
This Principle is about providing full information so that any surveillance policy/legislation can be scrutinised (see Approval Principle).
Effective public scrutiny of legislation assumes that Parliament has access to all relevant documents produced in relation to a surveillance proposal (including legal background, a Human It is recognised that some documents might have to be subject to special procedures and might not be published as a result of the scrutiny process (e.g. because they contain confidential material).
Some documents might, in Parliamentary terms, be only accessible in a very restricted fashion (e.g. by Privy Councillors), but the general rule is the provision of information to Parliament for scrutiny purposes-not its withholding. It is noted that Government has chosen to provide information to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) on a confidential basis (JCHR: 16th
Report, Appendix ).
If a policy decision was to be devolved to a lower tier of government (e.g. Local Authority), then the Principle would still apply and information would be provided (e.g. to Councillors).
At the surveillance policy level, the Principle could require the release of information about any privacy risk assessment that has been undertaken -this could be the Surveillance Impact system to monitor public places should justify its existence in terms of identifiable purposes and measurable outcomes. The identification of likely measurable outcomes permits the comparison that is essential to the Reporting Principle (which deals with actual outcomes).
Any information obtained via the Justification Principle should become subject to the Freedom of Information Act; this engages the exemptions and appeals process in relation to any information provided to the public. To gain public confidence, information about surveillance policy (e.g.
justifications, complaints procedures) should be proactively made available by the public authority performing the surveillance (e.g. on an appropriate web-site).
Principle 2: THE APPROVAL PRINCIPLE
Any surveillance is limited to lawful purposes defined in legislation where such legislation has been thoroughly scrutinised by a fully informed Parliament and, where appropriate, informed public debate has taken place.
Commentary on the Principle
The Principle follows the application of the Justification Principle, in that information provided as justification for surveillance (and costs of surveillance) can be independently assessed by those undertaking the scrutiny. The Approval and Justification Principles, by inference, are likely to draw out any alternatives to the surveillance, and thereby strengthen the justification for, and the public acceptability of, any surveillance that is eventually authorised.
Any relevant Regulator should have a role in assisting Parliament or informing public debate by commenting on the information provided by the application of the Justification Principle.
Obviously public comment on specific topics might need to be restrained in some areas where a need for secrecy can be claimed. To strengthen the scrutiny, Parliament could permit a Select Committee to take privacy under its remit (e.g. the Joint Committee on Human Rights seems an appropriate vehicle given the overlap between data protection and human rights). Currently such issues are discussed in the narrow context of a Committee's specialist remit (e.g. child protection and privacy, science and privacy in relation to the DNA database; the ID Card and privacy, etc) with the result that a joined-up picture of how all Government initiatives interact has yet to be completed by Parliament 36 .
It is suggested that a Regulator could report to a specific Committee which could task (and fund) the Commissioner to investigate matters of concern. Reports from the Commissioner could be tabled before that Committee which decides what is published. It is also recommended that Select
Committees of Parliament should allow, if they decide, experts in the field to question Ministers or witnesses. This is because, often, the devil is in the complex detail of how surveillance occurs and not on the broad principle of whether surveillance should occur 37 .
Where surveillance (in particular, data sharing or revealing of identity information) occurs with consent of the individuals concerned, the Approval Principle is satisfied if that consent is properly formulated; the Regulator has powers to modify improper consent procedures.
Principle 3: THE SEPARATION PRINCIPLE:
Procedures which authorise or legitimise a surveillance activity are separate from procedures related to the actual surveillance itself; the more invasive the surveillance, the wider the degree of separation.
Commentary on the Principle
This Principle mitigates the problems identified in Part 1 of this paper where Ministers are often politically responsible for the policies which require surveillance to succeed and for the mechanisms that protect private and family life from unwarranted intrusion. Some public bodies also have this dual responsibility and produce Codes of Practice specifying their procedures that cover both surveillance and privacy protection 38 .
As the Approval Principle (and Reporting Principle in the case of legislation that has been enacted) One would expect the Regulator to give advice in relation to the correct surveillance procedures to be followed whilst the Independent Supervision and Reporting Principles permits the Regulator to intervene on procedural matters if need be.
The Adherence Principle provides an oversight mechanism that could include supervision of the privacy related obligations that are connected to the Government's Data Handling Review (e.g.
there is a senior board member responsible for the processing of personal data, that there is suitable training of staff, that procedures are reviewed and maintained, and that risk assessments are taken at regular periods). The same applies to initiatives such as compliance with those privacy-related elements of the National Information Assurance Strategy (Cabinet Office: 2008) .
From an individual's perspective, the Adherence Principle is important. If an individual experiences failures in surveillance procedure, that individual has to be able to raise issues with the relevant Regulator who then has to possess sufficient clout to resolve and investigate any problem (the subject of the next two Principles). 
This Principle deals with the information recorded by those undertaking the surveillance in order to reassure the public that a surveillance activity has followed the rules. These records include From an individual's perspective, accountability is achieved if he or she can refer relevant matters to a Regulator for investigation (e.g. after becoming aware of an unjustifiable surveillance activity that involves them). This involvement could extend from complaints for individuals that they are subjected to unwarranted surveillance or to suggestions from individuals on policy matters.
Principle 6: THE INDEPENDENT SUPERVISION PRINCIPLE
The system of supervision for a surveillance activity is independent of Government, well financed, and has effective powers of investigation and can delve into operational matters.
Commentary on the Principle
The Principle ensures that a Regulator should be able to investigate any aspect of a surveillance activity (including national security) where the Regulator defines the thresholds of what would be considered a valid complaint (in order to exclude vexatious or trivial complaints).
To achieve this objective, a Regulator should possess effective powers of investigation, intervention, audit and prosecution that can extend into operational matters and should be able to employ security cleared experts to investigate relevant matters where this is needed. The Regulator should be able to fine, prosecute or require restitution to individuals who have been significantly damaged or distressed by an inappropriate surveillance activity (see the Compensation Principle).
The Regulator should have a last-resort the power to halt the processing of personal data. This could arise following application to a High Court judge or a power that was subject to appeal via a Tribunal mechanism. The reference to a Court or Tribunal is important as it allows the body undertaking the surveillance to make counter arguments that these powers should not be exercised.
In the case of sensitive surveillance operations, the Court/Tribunal can decide whether its hearings are in public or not.
In general, however, any Regulator is unlikely to use his powers immediately or publicise a In the case of the use of Ministerial powers that have been generously interpreted, the Regulator should be provided with an "Article 8 (Incompatibility) Notice" which, as a last resort, can be used to test whether a particular Statutory Instrument or primary legislation is compatible with human rights law 43 . This Notice can be appealed to the Courts so that the issue of compatibility with
Human Rights law can be tested.
If such a Notice were to be served, it would signal a severe dispute between Government and
Regulator and one would expect Parliament to investigate. So as an intermediary measure, therefore, the Regulator should also be able to require or recommend to Parliament that a particular use of Ministerial powers or procedure should be reviewed. Alternatively the Regulator could be required to negotiate with the Minister before serving such a Notice.
If an organisation were to employ an independent Data Protection Officer, an idea that has resurfaced in the Information Commissioner's written evidence to Parliament 44 , the Regulator could specify the procedures, records or reporting framework that Officer maintains in relation to a surveillance activity (the Reporting Principle).
To ensure independent supervision, a Regulator supervising a surveillance activity should be appointed by, removed by, and report to Parliament. Distance from Ministerial influence in the appointment of a Regulator is important. It is suggested that some candidates could be proposed by the relevant Cabinet Minister to be a Regulator but the final appointment (whether on the Ministerial list or not) should be approved by a Parliamentary process or by an independent public appointments commission.
Where surveillance occurs with consent of the individuals concerned, the Principle is satisfied if the Regulator can ensure that any individual consent is properly formulated.
The Regulator should be identified in law as being independent assessor of relevant surveillance activities with particular responsibility to protect the public. Appeals processes against a 
The Principle is aimed at empowering the individual and provides an extension of individual rights in the way that would encourage, in particular, a public authority not to exceed its powers.
There are two elements: a new statutory "right to privacy of personal data" and a revised right to object to the processing of personal data (currently found in Section 10 of the DPA).
In the UK, for example, the right to privacy of personal data could be implemented as an amendment to the Sixth Data Protection Principle and expressed in human rights terms. By implementing a right to the privacy of personal data under the auspices of the Data Protection Act, the processing of personal data for the Special Purpose (i.e. freedom of expression purposes)
will be left undisturbed 46 ; investigative journalism, for example, is unaffected by the change.
Obviously this Principle has to be qualified in a way that engages the exemptions found in Article However, this Privacy Principle should, be extended to include surveillance undertaken in the domestic circumstance (Pounder C: 2002) ; for example, a householder who installs a CCTV security systems and which also covers neighbours' premises, as currently the householder can be exempt from the application of all the Data Protection Principles and rights 47 . However, it is recognised that this could be a very difficult area to balance correctly -and it could be that a right to object to the processing could work better (see below).
The Section 10 right to object to the processing of personal data under the DPA currently requires the processing to cause substantial damage or substantial distress and for that damage or distress to be unwarranted. Additionally, the right is constrained to that processing undertaken in specific circumstances 48 . These thresholds and limitations, in effect, neutralise a right that cannot be exercised easily by the individual concerned.
The suggestion is that if data sharing occurs following a surveillance activity, then the burden of proof for the right to object should be reversed. Thus, if the right is exercised, the organisation concerned would continue the processing of personal data if it could show that the processing of personal data was warranted in terms of a specific public interest specified in Article 8(2) of the 46 Section 32 of the DPA protects the Press until publication of the personal data concerned. 47 Section 36 of the DPA (Domestic purpose exemption). 48 The processing has to be legitimised in terms of paragraph 5 and 6 of Schedule 2 of the DPA Human Rights Convention (e.g. that data sharing or surveillance was necessary in terms of crime prevention, public health, national security etc).
In summary, a revised right to object should not interfere with that processing of personal data that has been undertaken by law enforcement etc, but the right would be easier to claim by the individual, in a context where the processing had been undertaken by a public authority on grounds such as administrative convenience 49 . Note that if individuals trusted the data sharing arrangements undertaken by public authorities, then it is unlikely that such individuals would need to exercise the right to object.
It is also noted that there could be a need to protect the public authority if the right to object to the processing of personal data was being exercised vexatiously (e.g. as part of a campaign to disrupt a public authority).
This Principle also extends to the issuing of fair processing notices (if applicable 50 ). Such notices are an important protection because it is difficult for individuals to protect their own privacy, or to object to the processing of their personal data, if they don't know whether their personal data are processed in the first place. However, these notice obligations have real value only if individuals can act on the information received (e.g. raise matters of concern with a Regulator).
Principle 8: THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE
An individual should obtain compensation if a surveillance activity has caused damage, distress or detriment that proves to be unjustified.
Commentary on the Principle
A Regulator, following detailed investigation under the Independent Supervision Principle, should be able to award limited remedial compensation, to the level assessed in a small claims court, to each individual who has been damaged and distressed as a result of a surveillance activity. 
This Principle ensures that breaches of other Principles do not arise from actions motivated by executive convenience.
Under the Human Rights Act, the Courts can make a "declaration of incompatibility" in relation to any piece of primary legislation or can strike out secondary legislation 52 . The possibility that a
Regulator can issue an Article 8 (Incompatibility) Notice (see the Independent Supervision Principle) makes this protection more accessible in the context of surveillance legislation and allows a Court to consider facts surrounding a surveillance activity. It is for the Court to decide whether any hearing is in public or not.
The suggestion is that this Principle can operate in a similar manner. For example, by a Regulator however, the assumption is that the public interest generated by the Regulator's report would oblige Parliament or a Committee to consider the surveillance issue in detail. It would need a vote in Parliament if the surveillance were to continue.
Concluding comment
Part 1 of this article shows that in the context of privacy protection, the current system of regulation is weak, the current law cannot be relied upon, and that Parliament is not in a position to scrutinise effectively. It is argued that there needs to be a far stronger "feed-back" loop which
gives an informed Parliament a leading role in deciding public policy with respect to balancing the need to perform surveillance against the need to respect private and family life. Part of the feedback loop is the empowered Regulator.
Concerns might arise because these Principles envisage conflict between the Regulator and the government of the day. However, if such conflict arises, the matter can be resolved by Parliament or the Courts; the former dealing with policy matters, the latter dealing with legalities. There is nothing in the Principles that is in conflict with the constitutional way of resolving social policy issues in a democratic society.
Finally, and most importantly. these Principles allow the surveillance society debate to take place in a context that rectifies the weaknesses in the current framework of information law governance. 
